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Abstract14
The importance of culture for human social evolution hinges largely on the extent to which15
culture supports outcomes that would not otherwise occur. An especially controversial claim16
is that social learning leads groups to coalesce around group-typical behaviours and associated17
social norms that spill over to shape choices in asocial settings. To test this, we conducted18
an experiment with 878 groups of participants in 116 communities in Sudan. Participants19
watched a short film and evaluated the appropriate way to behave in the situation drama-20
tised in the film. Each session consisted of an asocial condition in which participants provided21
private evaluations and a social condition in which they provided public evaluations. Pub-22
lic evaluations allowed for social learning. Across sessions we randomised the order of the23
two conditions. Public choices dramatically increased the homogeneity of normative evalua-24
tions. When the social condition was first, this homogenising effect spilled over to subsequent25
asocial conditions. The asocial condition when first was thus alone in producing distinctly26
heterogeneous groups. Altogether, information about the choices of others led participants to27
converge rapidly on similar normative evaluations that continued to hold sway in subsequent28
asocial settings. These spillovers were at least partly due to the combined effects of confor-29
mity and self-consistency. Conformity dominated self-consistency when the two mechanisms30
were in conflict, but self-consistency otherwise produced choices that persisted through time.31
Additionally, the tendency to conform was heterogeneous. Females conformed more than32
males, and conformity increased with the number of other people a decision maker observed33
before making her own choice.34
1 Introduction35
The role culture plays in shaping the evolution of human social cognition and social behaviour36
remains a central question in human evolutionary ecology [1, 2]. If genes tightly constrain37
culture, we can perhaps ignore culture and pay our respects to the phenotypic gambit in38
standard fashion [3], whatever the environment for which phenotypes are adapted [4, 5]. If39
culture generates outcomes that would not otherwise occur, we should consider gene-culture40
coevolution, with social cognition shaping cultural evolution, and cultural evolution shaping41
the genetic evolution of social cognition [1, 6].42
An especially prominent gene-culture coevolutionary hypothesis is that frequency-dependent43
social learning strategies like conformity support path-dependent dynamics [7–9]. A rare44
behaviour becomes increasingly rare; a common behaviour becomes increasingly common.45
2
Path-dependent cultural evolution has at least two broad implications. First, the associated46
dynamics homogenise groups. Second, provided some other mechanism generates sufficient47
variation between groups, the dynamics exaggerate and ultimately stabilise between-group48
variation. The overall pattern is one of limited variation within groups and potentially consid-49
erable variation between groups [10]. Most importantly, this pattern might persist even amid50
the constant flow of cultural information across group boundaries [11]. Genetic transmission51
cannot do this, and this discrepancy between what culture might do and what genes cannot52
do lies at the root of much controversy about culture and human evolution via selection at53
the level of the social group [12–16].54
Social norms represent one of the principal ways in which path-dependent cultural evolu-55
tion should shape behaviour. Social norms refer to locally pervasive, socially learned expec-56
tations about how people behave, how people expect others to behave, and how people think57
everyone ought to behave [17, 18]. A person can adhere to a norm for at least two generic58
reasons. On the one hand, someone might adhere for extrinsic reasons. For example, if a59
self-regarding person lives in a group with a norm and associated institution for punishing60
free riders, she cooperates because she believes she does best by avoiding punishment. Oth-61
erwise, she defects [19]. Such a person adheres because she wants group affiliates to see her62
adhering, or at least because cues indicating that choices might be observable have activated63
an equivalent psychology [20, 21]. On the other hand, someone might adhere because follow-64
ing the norm becomes intrinsically valuable in the specific sense that the norm spills over to65
affect behaviour when choices are made in social isolation. Spillovers of this sort might occur66
because someone comes to value the specific behaviour prescribed by the norm [22], because67
the person values behaving in a self-consistent fashion [23, 24], or because the person values68
conforming to the group, whatever that may require [1, 9, 25].69
Researchers have hypothesised that spillovers are special because they mean that norm70
adherence occurs with limited monitoring [26, 27]. This can reduce the costs of enforcing71
socially beneficial norms because groups waste few resources policing the deviant behaviour72
of their own members. In this sense, spillovers can be good for the group. Spillovers might73
also be good for the individual. Researchers have also hypothesised that, if norm violations74
are sometimes punished, simple adherence might allow the individual to benefit by avoiding75
the costs of constantly re-evaluating if and when a given norm is worth following [28].76
A key question thus concerns whether social information leads to homogeneous norms77
with spillovers. Experimental research has shown that frequency-dependent social learning78
strategies are extremely variable both across individuals and from one situation to another79
3
[29–35]. This kind of variation can have a dramatic effect on what happens at the group level80
[36–38]. In particular, even if conformity is common, the homogenisation of behaviour does81
not necessarily occur (§ 2, Fig. 1).82
Accordingly, we conducted an experiment in Sudan to examine whether homogeneous83
norms rapidly form in social settings and then spill over to asocial settings. We ask four84
related questions. First, does social information about the choices of others lead groups to85
converge quickly on a shared assessment of the correct way to behave? Second, if convergence86
occurs, do the effects spill over to asocial settings? Third, how does social information affect87
decision making, and do the effects vary systematically in some way [29, 30]? Finally, if88
spillovers occur, what are the relevant mechanisms?89
Because our study was large in scale, with 878 distinct groups, we can address the first90
two questions by working directly at the group level. This allows us to sidestep the question91
of how social learning strategies, which are likely to be highly variable [8, 9, 29, 30], translate92
into aggregate outcomes. We address the latter two questions by analysing individual choices,93
which in turn clarifies the processes behind the patterns at the aggregate level.94
2 The aggregate consequences of variation in social learning95
An analysis at the aggregate level is crucial because the significance of frequency-dependent96
social learning strategies hinges in part on their hypothesised tendency to reduce behavioural97
variation within groups [7]. We cannot reliably assume that homogenisation occurs simply98
because we find evidence for conformist decision making at the individual level. Specifically, a99
profusion of recent experiments have shown that, although conformity certainly occurs, social100
learning strategies vary enormously across individuals and from one situation to another101
[8, 29–35, 39–42]. This variation can dramatically affect cultural evolutionary dynamics,102
and in particular it can attenuate or eliminate the behavioural homogeneity associated with103
conformity [36–38].104
To provide a simple illustration, assume a population with two types of social learner105
(Fig. 1(a)). Both types choose a given behaviour with a probability that increases as the106
behaviour becomes more common, and both types rely on social learning strategies with the107
sigmoidal shape characteristic of conformist transmission [7, 9]. One type, however, is less108
responsive to social information than the other [8]. As the distribution over the two types109
changes (Fig. 1(b)), the steady states of the cultural evolutionary system also change. When110
the type that responds strongly to social information dominates, two stable steady states111
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exist near the boundaries, and behavioural variation is limited in either case. However, as112
the distribution shifts towards the less responsive type, the two stable steady states converge.113
Behaviour becomes increasingly heterogeneous in equilibrium, and eventually only a single114
stable steady state remains in which behavioural heterogeneity is at its maximum possible115
value. This outcome obtains even though all individuals have positively sloped sigmoidal116
strategies. Possibilities of this sort suggest the importance of directly analysing group-level117
phenomena in a causal way. With a serendipitous source of exogenous variation and a clever118
identification strategy, one can do this with observational data [11, 43, 44]. We take an119
experimental approach. In either case, if aggregate-level analyses show that enculturation120
has a strong homogenising effect, the result would support one of the basic claims of gene-121
culture coevolution, the claim that culture reduces the importance of within-group selection122
in structured populations [14].123
3 Methods124
We recruited 7087 randomly selected adults in 116 communities distributed throughout the125
state of Gezira, Sudan, in the localities of Umalgoura (46 communities) and East Gezira (70126
communities). Gezira is located between the White Nile and Blue Nile, and it is home to the127
largest irrigation project in Sudan. Representative survey data show that Gezira is typical of128
Sudan as a whole in numerous dimensions related to health and education [45]. The dominant129
economic activity in the area is farming, but people are also engaged in herding, trade, and130
government [46]. Social and political life tends to centre strongly around the community, and131
in particular endogamy is extremely common [47]. As is true throughout Sudan, Islam is132
ubiquitous. Communities in Umalgoura have a reputation locally for being less conservative133
than communities in East Gezira, especially in matters related to religion and gender.134
3.1 Sampling and participation135
For sampling, we turned to community leaders, who maintain lists of households and house-136
hold members in their respective communities. We reviewed these lists with community137
leaders shortly before the study to ensure the lists were up to date. Depending on the size138
of the community, we randomly sampled households with the intent of recruiting one par-139
ticipant each from 60, 120, or 180 households1 per community. After sampling households,140
1In practice, we set a target of 60 households per community in 103 of the 116 communities. The mean
number of actual participants in these communities was 55.09, and the range was from 42 to 62. We agreed
on a target of 60 per community after consulting with community leaders to determine the maximum number
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we contacted each household individually and invited a single adult to participate. In half141
of the sampled households in a community, we recruited an adult female. In the other half,142
we recruited an adult male. Participants received perfume, prayer mats, and kitchenware for143
participating.144
3.2 Decision-making task and experimental design145
In sessions of 10 participants or fewer (mean 8.072; std. deviation 2.681; 56.7% of sessions146
with 10), participants watched a short film about parenting. UNICEF, Sudan, produced the147
film as one of several short and entertaining productions related to child protection. The148
footage was recorded inside a family compound, and the setting was deliberately chosen to149
be a typical example of domestic life in the region. The well-known Sudanese writer Waleed150
Omer Babikir Alalfi wrote the script for the film, and professional Sudanese actors played151
the characters in the film.152
The film was about a father who gives his young son and daughter 20 Sudanese Pounds153
to go to the store (Supplementary Material, § 1). The son loses the money on the way. He154
returns home empty-handed and reluctantly reveals to his father what happened. The father155
gets quite angry and indicates he will punish his son. The father’s friend, who happens to be156
visiting while this drama unfolds, suggests that the responsibility was too much for children157
so young, and the father himself bears much of the blame.158
After viewing the film, participants were asked if they agreed that the child should be159
strongly punished for losing the money. As explained below, each participant responded to160
this question twice under two different conditions. For each repetition of the question, two161
options were available. A participant could choose to agree, or she could choose to disagree.162
Participants made choices in a randomly determined sequence. Each session consisted163
of two sequences, and thus each participant made two choices. Choices were asocial in one164
sequence in the sense that each participant had no information about the responses of the165
other participants for the sequence in question. Choices were social in the other sequence166
in the sense that everyone in the group could observe the choices of everyone else. Because167
of comparatively tolerant attitudes in matters related to gender, sessions consisted of both168
men and women in Umalgoura. In general, however, we were not able to do this in East169
Gezira, and almost all sessions consisted entirely of either men or women. Accordingly, in170
our analyses below we control for both region and the gender composition of sessions.171
of participants we could work with in one day in a single community. We targeted 120 or 180 households in a
handful of larger communities with facilities for running different sessions in different parts of town.
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Our design consisted of two treatments distinguished by the order of the asocial and172
social sequences. One treatment implemented the asocial sequence first and then the social173
sequence. We refer to this as the “asocial-social” treatment. The other treatment began174
with the social sequence and then moved to the asocial sequence. This is the “social-asocial”175
treatment. The resulting four conditions include the asocial sequence when first (A,s), the176
asocial sequence when second (s,A), the social sequence when first (S,a), and the social177
sequence when second (a,S).178
3.3 Procedures for an experimental session179
To conduct sessions, we hired and trained 16 facilitators through the office of the Gezira180
State Council for Child Welfare. Facilitators were young college graduates who lived in and181
around the Gezira capital city, Wad Madani. Half of the facilitators were women, and half182
were men.183
Experimental sessions took place primarily in community school buildings. For a given184
session, one facilitator conducted the experiment. At the beginning of the session, the facil-185
itator set up a computer, a projector, and a set of amplified speakers to show the film. We186
rented generators for communities off the grid. The facilitator also positioned a large wooden187
blind (Fig. 2) on a table at the front of the room. This blind allowed participants to make188
choices in the asocial condition that were unobservable to other participants.189
To determine the sequence in which participants responded, the facilitator placed small190
numbered pieces of paper in a box. Each participant blindly drew one piece of paper from191
the box. Participants kept these pieces of paper throughout the session. The facilitator192
used these numbers to seat participants in a randomly ordered sequence. The facilitator did193
this publicly to show that seating was entirely random. This allowed us to avoid offending194
participants who might have felt slighted because of where we seated them.195
The sequence additionally specified the order in which participants responded to the196
question about punishing the child. Randomising the sequence allowed us to seed groups197
with initial choices in a random fashion and thus eliminate in expectation the possibility of198
seeding sequences with the choices of influential participants. By extension, participants with199
relatively little influence often went first, which should have reduced the potential for social200
information to homogenise choices. In this way, our design provides a conservative approach201
to examining if social information homogenises normative evaluations.202
After determining the sequence, the facilitator explained that participants would watch a203
short film and then twice answer a question about the film. The facilitator did not explain at204
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this point what the film was about or what the question would be. The facilitator did explain205
that participants would have two options. Specifically, the facilitator passed out large opaque206
envelopes to all participants. Each envelope contained two pieces of paper, one with a large207
“X” and the other with a large “X”. The facilitator explained that the X meant “No, I do not208
agree”, while the X meant “Yes, I do agree”. After ensuring that everyone understood the209
answer categories, the facilitator conducted a short sound check and verified that everyone210
could see and hear the film. The facilitator re-emphasised that participants had to remain211
silent for the entire session and started the film. During the film, the facilitator flipped a coin212
to determine the treatment, asocial-social or social-asocial.213
After the film, the facilitator reminded everyone to remain silent as they would only use214
the two pieces of paper to communicate. The facilitator then asked the question, “Do you215
agree that the child should be strongly punished”? The facilitator called participants up to216
the front of the room in sequence to respond. After completing the first sequence, whether217
asocial or social, the facilitator reminded participants of the question and then continued to218
the second sequence, which always maintained the same ordering of participants as the first219
sequence.220
Whether first or second, asocial sequences proceeded as follows. The facilitator asked the221
appropriate participant to come to the front of the room with her envelope. The facilitator222
took the envelope from the participant, removed the two pieces of paper behind the blind,223
and placed them on the table (Fig. 2). The other participants could not see the pieces of224
paper. The facilitator asked the focal participant to point to the correct piece of paper to225
indicate her choice. The facilitator recorded the choice on a data sheet that none of the226
participants could see. The facilitator then returned the two pieces of paper to the envelope227
behind the blind, handed the envelope to the participant, and asked the participant to return228
to her seat. The facilitator then moved to the next participant in the sequence.229
Whether first or second, social sequences were identical to asocial sequences with one230
exception. Specifically, the participant first indicated her choice behind the blind, exactly231
as in the asocial treatment. Immediately after this, the facilitator asked the participant to232
raise the relevant piece of paper so that everyone could see the participant’s choice (Fig. 2).233
As with asocial sequences, participants did not speak. Communication was thus highly234
regulated. We did this to maximise control and isolate the effects of the one extremely235
small but critical difference between asocial and social sequences. The critical difference was236
whether the participant did or did not hold up the piece of paper corresponding to her choice.237
This design, of course, does not rule out the effects of other decision-making mechanisms,238
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mechanisms like those related to interacting with an unfamiliar facilitator or being in a room239
with other members of one’s community. Randomisation, however, renders these variables240
orthogonal to treatment, and thus they cannot explain treatment differences.241
3.4 Study approval and supporting data242
The Human Subjects Committee of the Faculty of Economics, Business Administration, and243
Information Technology at the University of Zurich approved the study. In addition, the244
Sudanese National Council for Child Welfare, the Gezira State Council for Child Welfare,245
the Gezira Ministries of Health and Education, and all relevant community authorities in246
all communities approved the study in Sudan. Participation was strictly voluntary and247
conditional on informed verbal consent. We have uploaded the data supporting this article248
and the R [48] code used for analysis as Supplementary Material.249
4 Homogeneous choices within groups250
To derive predictions for group-level outcomes, we focus on two separate dimensions of251
frequency-dependent social influence. First, we distinguish between various social learning252
strategies in terms of their aggregate consequences. Second, we distinguish between hypothe-253
ses stipulating exactly when social information affects choices. We call this the “reach” of254
social influence. When social influence has extensive reach, social information affects choices255
under diverse conditions. When social influence has limited reach, its consequences appear256
under a relatively limited set of conditions. We begin by focusing on the extent to which257
choices within groups were heterogeneous or homogeneous. The variable of interest is the258
variance in choices by sequence.259
4.1 Types of social influence260
Assume participants choose one of two options in sequence, as in our experiment. We label261
the two options “Y” and “N”, as in “Yes, I agree” and “No, I do not agree”. In addition,262
we focus on scenarios in which a single type of social learning dominates. This is only for263
analytical clarity. Indeed, as explained above (§ 2), experimental evidence indicates that264
social learning strategies vary considerably [29], and this can have a dramatic influence on265
cultural evolutionary dynamics (Fig. 1). This is precisely why we analyse group outcomes266
directly.267
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1. Linear transmission. Linear transmission [7] simply reproduces, in expectation, the268
current distribution of choices in the group. Linear transmission has no effect on the269
distribution of choices through time, and thus social information should have no effect270
on the variance in choices within groups.271
2. Non-conformist transmission. Non-conformity can take two basic forms. One form272
[9] leads groups to converge smoothly to an equal accumulated mix of Y and N choices.273
The other form [8, 41] leads groups to converge in an oscillating fashion to an equal274
accumulated mix of choices. In either case, the variance in choices should converge to275
its maximum possible value.276
3. Conformist transmission. Conformist transmission tends to exaggerate the size of277
any majority [7, 9], and this pushes the distribution of choices towards one of the278
boundaries. Groups should become increasingly homogeneous as a result, and the279
variance in choices within groups should go to zero.280
4.2 The reach of social influence281
We consider reach by distinguishing between self-consistency, an instrumental response to282
social information, and spillovers. We focus on scenarios in which one type of reach dominates.283
This is again for analytical clarity. We do not mean to imply that people do not or cannot284
vary in terms of when they respond to social information.285
1. Self-consistency. When self-consistency dominates [23, 24], an individual repeats her286
previous choice when choosing again. In our asocial-social treatment, asocial choices287
should determine what happens in the social condition. In the social-asocial treatment,288
social choices should determine what happens in the asocial condition. Social choices289
when first, however, need not be similar to asocial choices when first. Altogether,290
treatment variation in the ordering of the two conditions across participants should be291
decisive, but the distinction between the asocial and social conditions within any given292
participant is irrelevant. In terms of reach, social information affects choices in two of293
the four conditions. The effect is direct in the social condition when first and indirect294
in the subsequent asocial condition.295
2. Instrumental. If social influence is instrumental [26], its effects only appear when296
choices are observable by others in the group. By extension, the consequences of social297
information should only appear in our social conditions, regardless of whether first or298
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second. Treatment variation in the ordering of the two conditions across participants299
is irrelevant, but the distinction between the asocial and social conditions within any300
given participant is decisive. In terms of reach, social information only affects choices301
in the two social conditions. The effect is direct in both cases.302
3. Spillovers. If social information generates spillovers [26, 28, 49], social information303
shapes choices when it first becomes available and subsequently, even when no longer304
available. In our asocial-social treatment, choices should change as individuals move305
from the condition without social information to the condition with social information.306
In the social-asocial treatment, however, effects due to social information should ap-307
pear in the initial social condition and spill over to the subsequent asocial condition.308
Treatment variation in the ordering of conditions across participants interacts with the309
distinction between the asocial and social conditions within participants. In terms of310
reach, social information affects choices in three of the four conditions. The effect is311
direct in the two social conditions and indirect in the asocial condition when second.312
Importantly, as discussed in the introduction, spillovers might occur because of a desire313
to be self-consistent, but the asymmetry in spillovers implies that self-consistency does314
not dominate other concerns. If self-consistency dominates, choices in the second con-315
dition follow from choices in the first condition, regardless of what the first condition316
is. Spillovers, in contrast, as we use the term, specifically refer to choices in a social317
setting affecting subsequent choices in an asocial setting.318
4.3 Predictions and Results319
Crossing three forms of social influence with three types of reach leads to nine different320
combinations. If social influence is predominantly linear, choice heterogeneity should be321
the same across all four conditions because linear transmission has no expected effect on322
the distribution of choices in the group. We can ignore reach because reach concerns the323
conditions under which the effects of social influence appear.324
If non-conformity predominates, it increases choice heterogeneity under some conditions.325
If conformity predominates, it decreases choice heterogeneity under some conditions. The326
specific conditions that allow any change in heterogeneity to appear depend on reach. Under327
self-consistency, the change appears when the social condition is first (S,a), and it extends328
to the subsequent asocial condition (s,A). Instrumental social influence, in turn, ensures that329
the effects of social information obtain under social conditions, whenever they occur, (S,a)330
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and (a,S), but not otherwise. Finally, spillovers mean that social information affects choice331
heterogeneity under social conditions, (S,a) and (a,S), and when asocial choices follow social332
choices (s,A).333
For each sequence we calculated the final proportion of participants choosing Y. For se-334
quence n in the final position T , call this qn,T . Fig. 3 shows the distributions over values335
of qn,T for each of the four conditions. One condition was clearly different from the others.336
Namely, the asocial condition when first produced sequences with a clear mix of choices, and337
thus a relatively high variance in choices, at a much higher rate than the other three condi-338
tions. In particular, the other three conditions resulted in qn,T values near the boundaries339
roughly 45%-50% of the time, while the asocial condition when first only did so roughly 25%340
of the time.341
For statistical inference, we calculated the final variance in choices for sequence n as342
qn,T (1− qn,T ). We analysed these variance values as dependent variables in regression models343
(Supplementary Material, § 2) with model selection and multi-model inference [50, 51]. Our344
primary concern was to examine the experimental treatment effects. We designed the entire345
study to identify these effects, and we restricted the model selection exercise to include346
treatment dummies for (s,A), (S,a), and (a,S) in all models (Supplementary Material, § 2).347
We have also incorporated additional control variables to examine any associated effects in an348
exploratory fashion. We introduce these control variables here. For the analyses of individual349
choices below, we discuss these controls further and present relevant hypotheses suggested by350
earlier studies.351
First, we included a dummy indicating if the primary economic activity in the community352
is agriculture (Agriculture Comm) versus herding, government, and trading. Second, we353
included a dummy for communities in East Gezira (East Gezira) versus Umalgoura. Our354
local informants were unanimous in their belief that these two regions are different, with East355
Gezira viewed as more conservative than Umalgoura. Finally, we included the population356
size of the community (ln(Population Size)) and the proportion of participants in the session357
who were female (Prop Females). We systematically included or removed these variables in358
a model selection exercise explained in the Supplementary Material (§ 2). Because the data359
comprise multiple observations per session and per community, all models had nested random360
effects at these two levels.361
The analysis confirms that the variance in choices within groups was higher in the asocial362
condition when first compared to the other three conditions (Table 1). This pattern is363
only consistent with conformity plus spillovers. Regression results also show that choice364
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homogeneity was associated with communities in which agriculture was the primary economic365
activity, with communities in East Gezira, and with relatively large communities. In addition,366
sessions with a greater proportion of women were more homogeneous than sessions with fewer367
women. The analyses of individual choices that follow clarify the mechanisms behind these368
patterns.369
5 Analysis of individual choices370
Over all conditions, 23.4% of participant choices were Y (i.e. agree with strongly punishing371
the child). In the asocial condition when first (A,s), 30.1% of participants chose Y, while372
20.2% did so in the asocial condition when second (s,A). In social conditions, participants373
chose Y 23.7% of the time when the social condition was first (S,a) and 18.6% of the time374
when second (a,S). To analyse individual decision making, we used logistic regressions with375
Y (1) as the positive response (Supplementary Material, § 3). As above, we used model376
selection with multi-model averaging [50, 51] for statistical inference.377
We analysed individual choices in three different ways. First, we analysed all choices378
from all four conditions to provide a general overview of how choices varied according to379
the characteristics of the individual, the community, and the experimental session. Second,380
we analysed choices from the two social conditions, whether first or second, to examine381
potentially heterogeneous social learning strategies. Finally, we analysed choices from the382
second conditions in sessions, whether social or asocial, to identify how self-consistency and383
social learning may have jointly shaped decision making.384
5.1 All choices, all conditions385
To analyse all choices from all four conditions, we included treatment dummies for the condi-386
tions (s,A), (S,a), and (a,S), and we restricted the model selection exercise to ensure that these387
dummies appeared in all models (Supplementary Material, § 3.1). Mirroring the aggregate-388
level analysis above, we also incorporated controls for the community (Agriculture Comm,389
East Gezira, ln(Population Size)) and the session (Prop Females). Because the analysis fo-390
cuses on individual choices, we further included a dummy indicating if the decision maker391
was female (Female). We systematically included or removed control variables according to392
the model selection exercise detailed in the Supplementary Material (§ 3.1). Because the data393
for this analysis include multiple observations per subject, per session, and per community,394
we included random effects at all three levels in all models.395
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Table 2 shows the model averaged results. All else equal, participants from primarily396
agricultural communities (Agriculture Comm) were less likely to choose Y than people from397
other communities, and people from communities in East Gezira were less likely to choose398
Y than people from communities in Umalgoura. In addition, choosing Y was negatively399
associated with community size (ln(Population Size)). Because choices were slightly biased400
away from Y in general (Fig. 3), these results imply, quite apart from any effects related401
to conformity, relatively homogeneous choices in agricultural communities, in East Gezira,402
and in large communities (see Table 1). Individual choices had no clear relation with being a403
female (Female) or with the proportion of women in the experimental session (Prop Females).404
Finally, compared to the omitted category (A,s), Y choices were less common in both social405
conditions ((a,S) and (S,a)) and in the asocial condition when second (s,A).406
5.2 Social conditions, whether first or second407
To model choices in social conditions, we introduced a treatment dummy that indicates if408
the social condition was the first condition (Social First) in the session (i.e. (S,a)). We re-409
stricted the model selection exercise such that this dummy was present in every model. To410
examine social learning, we also introduced the observed proportion of Y choices for a given411
decision maker (Lag One Prop Yes) and the decision maker’s position in the sequence (Se-412
quence Position). Because social information was not available for the first participant in413
a sequence, we analysed choices from the second position onwards. With only one obser-414
vation per participant, models did not include random effects at the individual level, but415
they did incorporate nested random effects at the session and community levels. We incorpo-416
rated control variables for the individual (Female), the community (Agriculture Comm, East417
Gezira, ln(Population Size)), and the experimental session (Prop Females), and we system-418
atically included or removed variables based on the model selection exercise explained in the419
Supplementary Material (§ 3.2).420
Importantly, we also examined interactions between social information (Lag One Prop421
Yes) and all other variables. We did so to identify any systematic variation in social learning422
strategies based on the characteristics of the individual, the individual’s community, or the423
experimental session. Although this analysis should be considered exploratory, past studies424
suggest at least three key hypotheses. First, under some circumstances women tend to con-425
form or rely on social learning more than men [33–35]. In our case, such an effect would426
amount to a positive interaction between being a female and social information (Female ×427
Lag One Prop Yes). Second, large groups tend to aggregate information more effectively than428
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small groups [8, 52]. This suggests that people should show a stronger tendency to conform429
to the majority of a large group compared to that of a small group, and both classic [53]430
and recent [30] experimental studies have found this pattern. In our setting, this means that431
people late in the sequence should have conformed more than people early in the sequence,432
which implies a positive interaction between sequence position and social information (Se-433
quence Position × Lag One Prop Yes). Finally, a recent experimental study in Ethiopia [42]434
found that horticulturalists were more independent in their daily lives than pastoralists and435
other groups, and they relied less on social learning in an experiment. In our context, this436
logic suggests that participants from agricultural communities should have conformed less437
than others, which would translate into a negative interaction between agriculture and social438
information (Agriculture Comm × Lag One Prop Yes).439
Model-averaged results show that participants responded strongly to frequency-dependent440
social information (Table 3). The proportion of preceding Y choices (Lag One Prop Yes) was441
positively associated with the focal decision maker choosing Y. Positive interactions also442
reveal that, all else equal, females conformed more strongly than males (Female × Lag One443
Prop Yes), and participants choosing late in a sequence conformed more strongly than those444
early in the sequence (Sequence Position × Lag One Prop Yes). We found no evidence for445
other forms of heterogeneity in social learning. Of particular note, the tendency to conform446
did not vary based on whether the social condition was first in the session (Social First × Lag447
One Prop Yes). Nor did it vary based on whether agriculture was the primary productive448
activity in the community (Agriculture Comm × Lag One Prop Yes).449
The strong tendency to follow the trend among previous decision makers suggests that450
groups with social information should have quickly converged on a shared evaluation of the451
situation depicted in the film. Indeed, this was typically the case. Of the 878 social sequences452
in the study, 735 had an unambiguous majority choice (>50% Y or >50% N) at the midway453
point and the same unambiguous majority choice at the end. Of the remaining 143 social454
sequences, only 50 had one unambiguous majority choice halfway through, with the other455
choice clearly in the majority at the end. In effect, shared evaluations quickly established456
themselves and were self-reinforcing once this happened [10].457
5.3 Second conditions, whether asocial or social458
To model choices in the second conditions in sessions, we used a treatment dummy indicating459
if the second condition was social (Social). This dummy was present in every model consid-460
ered. To examine self-consistency, we incorporated a dummy indicating if the participant’s461
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choice in the paired (first) sequence in the session was Y (Subject Yes (P)). For social learn-462
ing, we relied as above on the observed proportion of Y choices in the sequence (Lag One463
Prop Yes)2. As in our analyses of social conditions, we restricted attention to choices from464
the second sequence position onwards. With one observation per subject, we did not include465
random effects at the individual level, but we did at the session and community levels.466
We considered control variables for the individual (Female), the community (Agriculture467
Comm, East Gezira, ln(Population Size)), and the experimental session (Prop Females). In468
addition, we considered interactions between the treatment and the participant’s first choice469
(Social × Subject Yes (P)), as well as between the treatment and social information (So-470
cial × Lag One Prop Yes). The interaction between treatment and the participant’s first471
choice identifies any variation in self-consistency by treatment. Analogously, the interaction472
between treatment and social information identifies in variation in social learning by treat-473
ment. We included or removed variables based on the model selection exercise outlined in474
the Supplementary Material (§ 3.3).475
Model-averaged results (Table 4) show that individuals made self-consistent choices (Sub-476
ject Yes (P)), and they followed the trend among previous decision makers in the current477
sequence (Lag One Prop Yes). Self-consistency did not vary by whether the second condition478
was asocial or social (Social × Subject Yes (P)). However, the tendency to follow the trend479
among upstream decision makers did vary by treatment. In particular, a positive interaction480
(Social × Lag One Prop Yes) indicates that this tendency was stronger in the social condition481
than the asocial condition.482
These results are consistent with the information that was available during the second483
condition in a session. Specifically, as long as a participant could remember her previous484
choice, she could make a self-consistent choice regardless of whether she was choosing in an485
asocial or a social condition. Accordingly, subjects were self-consistent. Moreover, when486
controlling for social learning (Lag One Prop Yes), the tendency to make self-consistent487
choices did not vary by treatment. In terms of social learning, however, social information was488
not available in the asocial condition (s,A), but it was available in the social condition (a,S).489
Congruent with this discrepancy, the positive interaction between frequency-dependent social490
information and the social condition (Social × Lag One Prop Yes) reveals that conformity491
was stronger when social information was available. This result, of course, must hold if people492
tend to conform when conformity is possible.493
2We do not include the final distribution of choices from the first sequence in the session as the estimated
effect would not be causal due to a form of endogeneity known as the “reflection problem” [54]
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6 Discussion494
With a large lab experiment in Sudan, we have shown that frequency-dependent social in-495
formation led participants to converge on a common evaluation of how to behave in a given496
social situation. Social information essentially doubled the rate at which groups developed a497
shared evaluation (Fig. 3). Moreover, homogeneous normative evaluations spilled over from498
a social setting to a subsequent asocial setting. These findings support the hypothesis that499
social learning generates relatively homogeneous social norms, and humans have a psychology500
well-disposed to carry these norms with them, even when group affiliates are not watching501
[22, 26–28, 55].502
In terms of the homogenising effects of frequency-dependent social information, we found503
that subjects exhibited a clear tendency to follow the crowd. This tendency, however, was504
not uniform. Some participants conformed more than others, and participants conformed505
more strongly in some situations than in others. In particular, females conformed more than506
males. This result is fully consistent with some previous studies [33–35], but interestingly a507
recent review concluded that sex differences in social learning are uncommon [29].508
We also found that the tendency to follow the crowd increased with a participant’s position509
in the sequence. To illustrate, a participant tenth in line was more likely to follow a two-510
thirds majority among the preceding nine decision makers than a participant fourth in line511
who faced the same relative choice frequencies. This result is consistent with the theoretical512
argument that large groups aggregate noisy information into a powerful signal [8, 52], and it513
is consistent with recent [30] and classic [53] experimental findings.514
We did not find further evidence for heterogeneity in social learning strategies. In particu-515
lar, choices were relatively homogeneous in sequences consisting of subjects from agricultural516
communities, communities in East Gezira, and relatively large communities (Table 1). This517
homogeneity, however, did not arise from some special tendency among these subjects to518
conform (Table 3). Rather, homogeneity arose from the fact that these subjects were simply519
more unanimous in their opinion that the child in the film should not be strongly punished520
(Table 2). In other words, pre-existing differences in values were responsible, not variation521
in the tendency to conform.522
Finally, we found that the response to social information did not vary according to whether523
the social sequence preceded or followed the asocial sequence in a session. This finding524
suggests that in our experiment social learning superseded self-consistency. Altogether our525
results on social learning show that people followed the majority, but the propensity to do so526
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varied by both individual and circumstance. Because this kind of variation can shape cultural527
evolutionary dynamics in a wide variety of ways [36–38, 56], future empirical research should528
continue to focus on the structure of heterogeneous social learning strategies and their link529
to aggregate outcomes.530
In terms of the spillovers we observed, a key question centres on identifying the underlying531
mechanisms. As one possibility, the social treatment when first led people to update their532
beliefs about the opinions and choices of others in the community [17, 18]. In the subsequent533
asocial treatment, people responded to their updated beliefs because choices about how to534
discipline one’s children involve incentives to coordinate. While possible, participant choices535
were extremely heterogeneous for the subset of choices in which social information could have536
had no effect (Supplementary Material, § 4). This suggests that either inaccurate beliefs were537
pervasive, which seems unlikely with so many small tightly-knit communities, or the movie538
addressed a domain without strong coordination incentives.539
As another possible mechanism supporting spillovers, the social treatment when first led540
people to change what they value. This mechanism can take at least two forms. On the541
one hand, perhaps people actually came to value a lenient approach to child rearing after542
participating in the social condition. The claim, in effect, is that people internalised the value543
system represented by the collective opinion [22, 26, 27]. Although an intriguing possibility,544
our data do not allow us to isolate such an effect.545
Nonetheless, whatever the role of internalisation, self-consistency seems to have been546
at least partly responsible for the spillovers observed. In particular, frequency-dependent547
social learning homogenised choices in social conditions (Table 1). Moreover, the underlying548
tendency to follow the crowd was equivalently pronounced regardless of whether the social549
condition came first or second (Table 3), but it was more pronounced in social conditions550
than in asocial conditions (Table 4). Finally, controlling for the effects of frequency-dependent551
social information, participants were as equally likely to exhibit self-consistent behaviour in552
the asocial condition when second as in the social condition when second (Table 4). In other553
words, once we account for the effects of social information, participants exhibited a stable554
propensity to make consistent choices through time.555
These results suggest a kind of ranked interaction between conformity and self-consistency.556
When the two mechanisms come into conflict, as in our asocial-social treatment, following557
the crowd takes precedence. Without such a conflict, as in our social-asocial treatment,558
self-consistency shapes decision making. Although we cannot say if this kind of interaction559
was entirely responsible for the spillovers we observed, our analysis of choices in the second560
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conditions of sessions indicates that it was at least part of the story. More broadly, we found561
that frequency-dependent social information can rapidly homogenise groups, and the effects of562
this process persist even when one’s choices are hidden from the group. Both findings support563
a key hypothesis about how culture shapes the overall selective regime by attenuating local564
variation in structured populations [10, 14].565
Acknowledgements and funding566
We thank the Gezira State government, the Sudanese National Council for Child Welfare, the567
Gezira State Council for Child Welfare, and local authorities in Umalgoura and East Gezira568
for supporting the study. We would also like to acknowledge the considerable efforts of the569
Gezira State Council for Child Welfare, our many facilitators and participants, the national570
field office of UNICEF in Khartoum, Amy Elhadi, Hilal El Fadil Ahmed, and Nadia Ahmed571
Mohmmed Zaid. The study was funded by the Swiss National Committee of UNICEF, who572
played no role in the design of the study, data collection, data analysis and interpretation, or573
the writing and submission of the paper.574
Author contributions575
CE and SV designed the study, liaised with government officials, and oversaw recruitment576
and data collection. SV trained the study coordinators and data collectors. CE analysed the577
data. CE and SV interpreted the results and wrote the paper.578
Competing interests579
We have no competing interests.580
References581
[1] Peter J. Richerson and Richerson Boyd. Not By Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed582
the Evolutionary Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.583
[2] Joseph Henrich. The Secret of Our Success: How Culture is Driving Human Evolution,584
Domesticating Our Species, and Making Us Smarter. Princeton University Press, 2015.585
[3] Alan Grafen. Natural selection, kin selection and group selection. Behavioural ecology:586
An evolutionary approach, 2:62–84, 1984.587
19
[4] Eric A. Smith, Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, and Kim Hill. Controversies in the evolu-588
tionary social sciences: a guide for the perplexed. Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 16589
(3):128–135, 2001.590
[5] Leda Cosmides and John Tooby. Evolutionary Psychology: New Perspectives on Cogni-591
tion and Motivation. Annual Review of Psychology, 64:201–229, 2013. doi: 10.1146/an-592
nurev.psych.121208.131628.593
[6] Kevin N. Laland, Kim Sterelny, John Odling-Smee, William Hoppitt, and Tobias Uller.594
Cause and effect in biology revisited: Is Mayrs proximate-ultimate dichotomy still595
useful? Science, 334(6062):1512–1516, 2011. doi: 10.1126/science.1210879. URL596
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/334/6062/1512.abstract.597
[7] Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago:598
University of Chicago Press, 1985.599
[8] Charles Efferson, Rafael Lalive, Peter J. Richerson, Richard McElreath, and Mark600
Lubell. Conformists and mavericks: the empirics of frequency-dependent cultural trans-601
mission. Evolution and Human Behavior, 29(1):56–65, 2008.602
[9] T. J. H. Morgan and K. N. Laland. The biological bases of conformity. Frontiers in603
Neuroscience, 6(87), 2012. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2012.00087.604
[10] H Peyton Young. The evolution of social norms. Annual Review of Economics, 7(1):605
359–387, 2015.606
[11] Beatrix Eugster, Rafael Lalive, Andreas Steinhauer, and Josef Zweimueller. Culture,607
Work Attitudes, and Job Search Evidence from the Swiss language border. Working608
paper, University of Lausanne, 2014.609
[12] Laurent Lehmann and Marcus W. Feldman. The co-evolution of cultur-610
ally inherited altruistic helping and cultural transmission under random611
group formation. Theoretical Population Biology, 73(4):506 – 516, 2008.612
ISSN 0040-5809. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2008.02.004. URL613
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0040580908000233.614
[13] Laurent Lehmann, Marcus W. Feldman, and Kevin R. Foster. Cultural transmission can615
inhibit the evolution of altruistic helping. The American Naturalist, 172(1):12–24, 2008.616
ISSN 00030147. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/587851.617
20
[14] Robert Boyd, Peter J. Richerson, and Joseph Henrich. Rapid cultural adaptation can618
facilitate the evolution of large-scale cooperation. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiol-619
ogy, 65(3):431–444, 2011. ISSN 0340-5443. doi: 10.1007/s00265-010-1100-3. URL620
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00265-010-1100-3.621
[15] Lucas Molleman, Ido Pen, and Franz J. Weissing. Effects of Conformism on the Cul-622
tural Evolution of Social Behaviour. PLoS ONE, 8(7):e68153, 2013. doi: 10.1371/jour-623
nal.pone.0068153.624
[16] Peter Richerson, Ryan Baldini, Adrian V. Bell, Kathryn Demps, Karl Frost, Vicken625
Hillis, Sarah Mathew, Emily K. Newton, Nicole Naar, Lesley Newson, and et al. Cultural626
group selection plays an essential role in explaining human cooperation: A sketch of the627
evidence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 39, 2016. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X1400106X.628
[17] Cristina Bicchieri. The grammar of society: The nature and dynamics of social norms.629
Cambridge University Press, 2005.630
[18] Cristina Bicchieri. Norms in the wild: How to diagnose, measure, and change social631
norms. Oxford University Press, 2016.632
[19] Ernst Fehr and Simon Gaechter. Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415(10633
January):137–140, 2002.634
[20] Edward H. Hagen and Peter Hammerstein. Game theory and human evolution: A635
critique of some recent interpretations of experimental games. Theoretical Population Bi-636
ology, 69(3):339 – 348, 2006. ISSN 0040-5809. doi: DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2005.09.005. URL637
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WXD-4J61667-1/2/0103a9d11f1d517b3f00be4260eac9ee.638
[21] Nichola J. Raihani and Redouan Bshary. Why humans might help strangers. Frontiers639
in Behavioral Neuroscience, 9(39), 2015. doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00039.640
[22] Samuel Bowles. Endogenous preferences: the cultural consequences of markets and other641
economic institutions. Journal of Economic Literature, 36(1):75–111, 1998.642
[23] Robert B Cialdini, Melanie R Trost, and Jason T Newsom. Preference for consistency:643
The development of a valid measure and the discovery of surprising behavioral implica-644
tions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69(2):318, 1995.645
[24] Rosanna E Guadagno and Robert B Cialdini. Preference for consistency and social646
influence: A review of current research findings. Social Influence, 5(3):152–163, 2010.647
21
[25] Robert B. Cialdini and Noah J. Goldstein. Social influence: compliance and conformity.648
Annual Review of Psychology, 55:591–621, 2004.649
[26] Herbert Gintis. The hitchhiker’s guide to altruism: gene-culture coevolution and the650
internalization of norms. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 4(220):407–418, 2003.651
[27] Maciej Chudek and Joseph Henrich. Culture–gene coevolution, norm-psychology and652
the emergence of human prosociality. Trends in cognitive sciences, 15(5):218–226, 2011.653
[28] Joseph Henrich and Jean Ensminger. Theoretical foundations: The coevolution of social654
norms, intrinsic motivation, markets, and the institutions of complex societies. Exper-655
imenting with Social Norms: Fairness and Punishment in Cross-Cultural Perspective,656
eds Ensminger J, Henrich J (Russel Sage Foundation, New York), pages 19–44, 2014.657
[29] Alex Mesoudi, Lei Chang, Sasha R. X. Dall, and Alex Thornton. The Evolution of658
Individual and Cultural Variation in Social Learning. Trends in Ecology & Evolution,659
31(3):215–225, 2016.660
[30] Michael Muthukrishna, Thomas J.H. Morgan, and Joseph Hen-661
rich. The when and who of social learning and conformist transmis-662
sion. Evolution and Human Behavior., 37(1):10–20, 2016. ISSN 1090-663
5138. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.05.004. URL664
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513815000586.665
[31] T. J. H. Morgan, L. E. Rendell, M. Ehn, W. Hoppitt, and K. N. Laland. The evolutionary666
basis of human social learning. Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 279(1729):653–662,667
2012.668
[32] Lucas Molleman, Pieter van den Berg, and Franz J. Weissing. Consistent individual669
differences in human social learning strategies. Nature Communications, 5(3570), 2014.670
doi: 10.1038/ncomms4570.671
[33] Rod Bond and Peter B Smith. Culture and conformity: A meta-analysis of studies using672
asch’s (1952b, 1956) line judgment task. Psychological bulletin, 119(1):111, 1996.673
[34] Catharine P Cross, Gillian R Brown, Thomas JH Morgan, and Kevin N Laland. Sex674
differences in confidence influence patterns of conformity. British Journal of Psychology,675
108(4):655–667, 2017.676
22
[35] Charlotte O Brand, Gillian R Brown, and Catharine P Cross. Sex differences in the use677
of social information emerge under conditions of risk. PeerJ, 6:e4190, 2018.678
[36] Mark Granovetter. Threshold models of collective behavior. American journal of soci-679
ology, 83(6):1420–1443, 1978.680
[37] H Peyton Young. Innovatin diffusion in heterogeneous populations: contagion, social681
influence, and social learning. American Economic Review, 99(5):1899–1924, 2009.682
[38] Matthew O Jackson and Dunia Lo´pez-Pintado. Diffusion and contagion in networks683
with heterogeneous agents and homophily. Network Science, 1(1):49–67, 2013.684
[39] Jacob K. Goeree and Leeat Yariv. Conformity in the lab. Journal of the Economic685
Science Association, 1(1):15–28, 2015. ISSN 2199-6776. doi: 10.1007/s40881-015-0001-686
7. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40881-015-0001-7.687
[40] Alex Mesoudi, Lei Chang, Keelin Murray, and Hui Jing Lu. Higher frequency of social688
learning in china than in the west shows cultural variation in the dynamics of cultural689
evolution. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 282(1798):690
20142209, 2015.691
[41] Charles Efferson, Rafael Lalive, Maria Paula Cacault, and Deborah Kistler. The evolu-692
tion of facultative conformity based on similarity. PLoS One, 11(12):e0168551, 2016.693
[42] Luke Glowacki and Lucas Molleman. Subsistence styles shape human social learning694
strategies. Nature human behaviour, 1(5):0098, 2017.695
[43] Beatrix Eugster, Rafael Lalive, Andreas Steinhauer, and Josef Zweimller. The de-696
mand for social insurance: Does culture matter? The Economic Journal, 121(556):697
F413–F448, 2011. ISSN 1468-0297. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02479.x. URL698
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02479.x.699
[44] Sara Lowes, Nathan Nunn, James A Robinson, and Jonathan Weigel. The evolution of700
culture and institutions: Evidence from the Kuba Kingdom. Technical report, National701
Bureau of Economic Research, 2015.702
[45] Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), UNICEF Sudan. Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey703
2014 of Sudan, Final Report, 2016.704
23
[46] Sonja Vogt, Nadia Ahmed Mohmmed Zaid, Hilal El Fadil Ahmed, Ernst Fehr, and705
Charles Efferson. Changing cultural attitudes towards female genital cutting. Nature,706
538:506–509, 2016.707
[47] Charles Efferson, Sonja Vogt, Amy Elhadi, Hilal El Fadil Ahmed, and Ernt Fehr. Female708
genital cutting is not a social coordination norm. Science, 349(6255):1446–1447, 2015.709
doi: 10.1126/science.aaa7978.710
[48] R Core Team. R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Comput-711
ing. R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria, 2017. URL712
https://www.R-project.org/.713
[49] Sergey Gavrilets and Peter J Richerson. Collective action and the evolution of social714
norm internalization. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, page 201703857,715
2017.716
[50] Kenneth P. Burnham and David R. Anderson. Model Selection and Multimodel Inference:717
A Practical Information-Theoretic Approach. New York: Springer-Verlag, 2nd edition,718
2002.719
[51] CE Grueber, S Nakagawa, RJ Laws, and IG Jamieson. Multimodel inference in ecology720
and evolution: challenges and solutions. Journal of evolutionary biology, 24(4):699–711,721
2011.722
[52] Charles Perreault, Cristina Moya, and Robert Boyd. A bayesian approach to the723
evolution of social learning. Evolution and Human Behavior, 33(5):449 – 459, 2012.724
ISSN 1090-5138. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2011.12.007. URL725
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513811001437.726
[53] Solomon E. Asch. Opinions and social pressure. Scientific American, 193(5):1–7, 1955.727
[54] Charles F. Manski. Economic analysis of social interactions. The Journal of Economic728
Perspectives, 14(3):115–136, 2000.729
[55] James S. Coleman. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,730
1990.731
[56] Duncan J. Watts and Peter Dodds. Threshold models of social influence. The Oxford732
Handbook of Analytical Sociology, pages 475–497, 2009.733
24
[57] Andrew Gelman. Scaling regression inputs by dividing by two standard deviations.734
Statistics in Medicine, 27(15):2865–2873, 2008.735
25
Table 1: OLS regressions with the variance in choices by sequence as the dependent variable.
Results are the full model averaged results based on the model selection exercise detailed
in § 2 of the Supplementary Material. Models (§ 4.3) include random effects for sessions
within communities, control variables for the community (Agriculture Comm, East Gezira,
ln(Population Size)), and a control variable for the experimental session (Prop Females).
They additionally include dummies for the asocial condition when second (s,A), the social
condition when first (S,a), and the social condition when second (a,S). All continuous variables
have been standardised to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 0.5, and dummy
variables have been translated to have a mean of zero [51, 57]. Blue indicates estimates with
confidence intervals that do not include zero.
Adjusted Relative
Parameter Estimate Std. Error 95% C.I. Importance
Intercept 0.003 0.020 [-0.035,0.041]
Agriculture Comm -0.189 0.060 [-0.307,-0.071] 0.99
East Gezira -0.198 0.042 [-0.280,-0.115] 1.0
ln(Population Size) -0.139 0.041 [-0.218,-0.059] 1.0
Prop Females -0.064 0.031 [-0.124,-0.004] 0.93
(s,A) -0.256 0.031 [-0.316,-0.195] 1.0
(S,a) -0.227 0.031 [-0.287,-0.166] 1.0
(a,S) -0.289 0.020 [-0.328,-0.250] 1.0
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Table 2: Logistic regressions for individual choices, with Y as the positive response (1), for
all choices in all conditions. Results are the full model averaged results based on the model
selection exercise in § 3.1 of the Supplementary Material. Models (§ 5.1) include random
effects for participants within sessions within communities, a variable indicating a female
participant (Female), control variables for the community (Agriculture Comm, East Gezira,
ln(Population Size)), and a control variable for the experimental session (Prop Females).
They also include dummies for experimental condition ((s,A), (S,a), and (a,S)). All continuous
input variables have been standardised to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of
0.5, and independent dummy variables have been translated to have a mean of zero [51, 57].
Blue indicates estimates with confidence intervals that do not include zero.
Adjusted Unconditional Relative
Parameter Estimate Std. Error 95% C.I. Importance
Intercept -9.683 0.223 [-10.120,-9.246]
Female 0.045 0.119 [-0.187,0.278] 0.28
Agriculture Comm -0.852 0.247 [-1.337,-0.367] 1.0
East Gezira -0.612 0.194 [-0.991,-0.233] 1.0
ln(Population Size) -0.658 0.184 [-1.018,-0.299] 1.0
Prop Females 0.021 0.092 [-0.160,0.202] 0.21
(s,A) -1.775 0.223 [-2.212,-1.338] 1.0
(S,a) -0.565 0.191 [-0.939,-0.191] 1.0
(a,S) -4.745 0.244 [-5.222,-4.268] 1.0
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Table 3: Logistic regressions for individual choices, with Y as the positive response (1), in the social
conditions. Results are the full model averaged results based on the model selection exercise in § 3.2 of the
Supplementary Material. Models (§ 5.2) include random effects for sessions within communities, control
variables for the participant (Female, Sequence Position), control variables for the community (Agriculture
Comm, East Gezira, ln(Population Size)), and a control variable for the experimental session (Prop Females).
They additionally include a dummy variable indicating if the social condition in question was first in the
session (Social First) and the proportion of Y choices among preceding subjects in the sequence (Lag One
Prop Yes). Interactions involving this latter variable (Lag One Prop Yes) identify any heterogeneity in social
learning strategies. All continuous input variables have been standardised to have a mean of zero and a
standard deviation of 0.5, and independent dummy variables have been translated to have a mean of zero
[51, 57]. Blue indicates estimates with confidence intervals that do not include zero.
Adjusted Relative
Parameter Estimate Std. Error 95% C.I. Importance
Intercept -1.737 0.068 [-1.870,-1.603]
Female -0.093 0.126 [-0.340,0.154] 1.0
Sequence Position -0.516 0.077 [-0.668,-0.364] 1.0
Agriculture Comm -0.527 0.179 [-0.877,-0.176] 1.0
East Gezira -0.442 0.134 [-0.704,-0.179] 1.0
ln(Population Size) -0.367 0.129 [-0.620,-0.115] 1.0
Prop Females -0.061 0.122 [-0.301,0.513] 0.51
Social First 0.153 0.087 [-0.017,0.323] 1.0
Lag One Prop Yes 1.243 0.118 [1.012,1.474] 1.0
Social First × Lag One Prop Yes 0.193 0.148 [-0.098,0.483] 1.0
Female × Lag One Prop Yes 0.692 0.214 [0.273,1.110] 1.0
Sequence Position × Lag One Prop Yes 0.551 0.176 [0.205,0.896] 1.0
Agriculture Comm × Lag One Prop Yes 0.115 0.189 [-0.255,0.484] 0.7
East Gezira × Lag One Prop Yes 0.255 0.214 [-0.164,0.674] 0.7
ln(Population Size) × Lag One Prop Yes 0.050 0.130 [-0.205,0.305] 0.7
Prop Females × Lag One Prop Yes 0.102 0.210 [-0.309,0.513] 0.3
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Table 4: Logistic regressions for individual choices, with Y as the positive response (1), in
the second conditions in sessions. Results are the full model averaged results based on the
model selection exercise in § 3.3 of the Supplementary Material. Models (§ 5.3) include ran-
dom effects for sessions within communities, control variables for the participant (Female,
Sequence Position), control variables for the community (Agriculture Comm, East Gezira,
ln(Population Size)), and a control variable for the experimental session (Prop Females).
They additionally include a dummy variable indicating if the second condition in question
was social (Social), a dummy indicating if the subject chose Y in the first condition of the
session (Subject Yes (P)), and the proportion of Y choices among preceding subjects in the
current sequence (Lag One Prop Yes). Interactions involving these latter two variables iden-
tify variation in self-consistency or social learning by experimental condition. All continuous
input variables have been standardised to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of
0.5, and independent dummy variables have been translated to have a mean of zero [51, 57].
Blue indicates estimates with confidence intervals that do not include zero.
Adjusted Relative
Parameter Estimate Std. Error 95% C.I. Importance
Intercept -2.532 0.083 [-2.695,-2.369]
Female 0.104 0.166 [-0.222,0.431] 1.0
Sequence Position -0.221 0.094 [-0.405,-0.038] 1.0
Agriculture Comm -0.457 0.172 [-0.794,-0.121] 1.0
East Gezira -0.521 0.132 [-0.780,-0.262] 1.0
ln(Population Size) -0.298 0.124 [-0.541,-0.055] 1.0
Prop Females -0.509 0.186 [-0.873,-0.145] 1.0
Social -0.813 0.126 [-1.059,-0.566] 1.0
Subject Yes (P) 3.599 0.119 [3.366,3.832] 1.0
Lag One Prop Yes 0.773 0.108 [0.561,0.985] 1.0
Social × Subject Yes (P) 0.014 0.112 [-0.205,0.233] 0.27
Social × Lag One Prop Yes 0.935 0.199 [0.546,1.324] 1.0
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Figure 1: The long-run aggregate effects of social learning strategies that vary. Assume
two possible behaviours, Y and N. Panel (a) shows two types of frequency-dependent social
learner. Each type chooses Y with a probability that increases as Y becomes more common,
and both do so according to a strategy with the sigmoidal shape characteristic of conformist
transmission [9]. The probability of choosing Y rises relatively steeply for one type, and this
type responds more strongly to social information. The other type is less responsive. Panel
(b) shows the steady states of the associated cultural evolutionary system. Solid lines are
locally stable steady states, and the dashed line is locally unstable. As the relative frequency
of the less responsive type increases, the stable steady states converge, and at some point
the system has a unique stable steady state with a uniform mix of Y and N. At this point,
behavioural heterogeneity takes its maximum possible value.
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Figure 2: An experimental session. The photo shows procedures for a social sequence in which
participants displayed their choices to everyone in the group. Thank you to Amy Elhadi for





































































Proportion in sequence choosing Y














Figure 3: Final aggregate outcomes by condition. Each sequence resulted in a final proportion
of participants choosing to agree with strong punishment of the child in the film (Y). Call this
proportion qn,T for sequence n. Histograms show distributions over qn,T values by condition.
Panel (a) shows the asocial condition in the asocial-social treatment (A,s), and panel (c) shows
the corresponding social condition (a,S). Panel (b) shows the asocial condition in the social-
asocial treatment (s,A), and panel (d) shows the corresponding social condition (S,a). Choices
within groups were relatively heterogeneous in the asocial condition when first and relatively
homogeneous in the other cases. This result shows that social information homogenised
choices within groups, and this homogenising effect spilled over to the subsequent asocial
setting.
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